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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK J. ALLEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
fJS. 
SOUTHERX PACIFIC COlVIP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court of Weber County, Utah, the Honorable John A. 
Hendricks, Judge thereof, presiding. For the conven-
ience of the Court and counsel, the parties will be re-
ferred to as they were in the lower court, wherein the 
appellant was the plaintiff and the appellee was the 
defendant. 
This appeal is on the judgment roll only. The only 
question involved is whether the Findings of Fact of the 
lower court support its Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment. 
Plaintiff's complaint, omitting headings, signatures, 
and verification, is as follows: 
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''Plaintiff complains of the defendant and 
for cause of action alleges: 
"1. That the defendant at all times herein-
after mentioned was a corporation organized and 
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Delaware, and authorized to do and 
doing business in this state. 
'' 2. That on or about the lOth day of Sep-
tember, 1947, the plaintiff, while in the City of 
Portland, Oregon, and while enrout from said 
city to Pocatello, Idaho, delivered and deposited 
with the defendant, and defendant received from 
plaintiff at the Union Station parcel room in 
Portland, Oregon, as aforesaid, a place of busi-
ness owned, operated, and under the control of 
the defendant, one large Samsonite travelling bag 
of the value of Forty Seven and 50j100 ($47.50) 
Dollars, containing the follo"\\ring items, together 
with their value on that date as follows: 
1 diamond ring ----------------------------$650.00 
1 21 jewel Longine watch____________ 375.00 
1 stick pin -------------------------------------- 400.00 
1 20-30 Colt revolver -------------------- 50.00 
1 blue suit -------------------------------------- 85.00 
1 tan gabardine suit -------------------- 87.50 
2 pairs Edwin Clapp shoes__________ 38.00 
2 Dobbs hats -------------------------------- 40.00 
1 Lifetime Parker pen set__________ 65.00 
1 white wool shirt ------------------------ 22.50 
5 sport shirts -------------------------------- 10.00 each 
1 dozen pure silk sox____________________ 1.50 each 
1 gabardine topcoat ____________________ 85.00 
1 electric razor ------------------------------ 22.50 
1 small portable radio ________________ 37.50 
10 neckties (hand painted) 7.50 each 
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4 neckties (hand painted) __________ 10.00 each 
2 pairs suspenders ---------------------- 2.50 each 
1 comb and brush__________________________ 4.50 each 
1 aluminum cigarette lighter ____ 4.50 
1 dozen handkerchiefs ________________ .50 each 
to be by 'the defendant safely and securely kept 
for the plaintiff for a compensation, and to be 
returned and re-delivered to the plaintiff upon 
request, and the defendant then and there under-
took to do so, and gave to the plaintiff a receipt 
in writing for the property, as hereinbefore set 
forth, said receipt bearing the number 396841. 
'' 3. That thereafter, and within several hours 
of his deposit, as hereinbefore described, plain-
tiff tendered to the defendant the receipt, as 
hereinbefore mentioned, and demanded that said 
defendant redeliver and return to the plaintiff 
the said goods hereinbefore described. 
'' 4. That the defendant did not take due care 
of or safely keep the goods of the plaintiff, nor 
did it, when requested, return or redeliver the 
_same to the plaintiff, but on the contrary, the 
travelling bag, together with the contents there-
in, was delivered by defendant to a Mrs. Alma 
Burtraw, of Warrenton, Oregon, or some other 
person or persons unknown to the plaintiff, and 
that by and through such eonduct on the part of 
the defendant, the goods were wholly lost to the 
plaintiff, to his damage in the sum of Twenty 
One Hundred Ninety ($2190.00) Dollars. 
"WHIDREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of Twenty 
One Hundred Ninety ($2190.00) Dollatrs, for 
costs of suit, and for such other and further relief 
as the Court may deem proper." 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To this complaint defendant filed its second amen-
ded answer as follows (omitting heading, signatures and 
verification) : 
''Comes now the defendant Southern Pacific 
Company and for its second amended answer to 
plaintiff's complaint on file herein, admits, de-
nies and alleges : 
\ 
"1. Admits paragraph 1 of said complaint. 
"2. Answering paragraph 2 of plaintiff's 
complaint defendant denies each and every alle-
gation ·therein contained. 
'' 3. Answering paragraph 3, defendant ad-
mits that plaintiff tendered to defendant a re-
ceipt or parcel claim check bearing the number 
396841 at Portland, Oregon, on or about Septem-
ber 10, 1947, and demanded that defendant return 
to plaintiff a certain bag. Further answering 
said paragraph 3 defendant denies each and every 
other allegation therein contained. 
'' 4. Answering paragraph 4 of said complaint 
defendant admits that it did not deliver to plain-
tiff the hag or any of the items described in plain-
tiff's complaint. Further answering said para-
graph 4, defendant denies each and every other 
allegation therein contained. 
'' 5. As a further, separate and affirmative 
defense to plaintiff's complaint defendant alleges 
that if plaintiff delivered to and deposited with 
defendant any bag or baggage or articles, includ-
ing the Samsonite travelling bag and its contents, 
a.s described in plaintiff's complaint, such de-
livery and deposit were at all times mentioned in 
said complaint under and subject to the terms 
and conditions written upon the said claim check 
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plaintiff alleg·es was given to him by defendant 
upon the alleged delivery and receipt of said 
bag; if plaintiff received any parcel check or 
receipt as alleged in his complaint, then such 
eheck or receipt was in words and figures as 
follows: 
·'NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or 
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed 
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater 
sum is declared and paid for at rate of 10 
cents for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for 
30 days or less. No parcel valued in excess 
of $250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remain-
ing on hand 30 days may be sold for charges.'' 
''On the re,Terse side thereof is printed these words: 
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED 
''FOR EXCESS LIABILITY SElE NOTICE 
ON OPPOSITE SIDE. 
''Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24 
hours or fraction thereof. Maximum charge 
for 30 days, $1.00. '' 
"That defendant never issued to plaintiff, 
at the time and place referred to in plaintiff's 
complaint, or otherwise, any parcel check which 
did not contain the foregoing provisions. 
''That the alleged delivery to defendant of 
said hag was also subject at all times stated in 
said complaint to the conditions written upon a 
notice defendant had posted at said check stand 
at Portland, Oregon, when plaintiff alleges he 
delivered said bag to defendant; that said notice, 
then and there plainly visible to plaintiff and 
others using said check stand, was in words and 
figures as follows: 
5 
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c 'Protect Your 
PARCELS 
Our liability for Loss or Damage is 
Limited to 
$25.00 
Greater value may be declared at time of 
checking upon payment of lOc for each ad-
ditional $25.00 value or fraction thereof. 
Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in value 
not accepted.'' 
"That the· above stated parcel check and 
notice then and there required all persons, in-
cluding plaintiff, checking any bag or parcels, 
to dec.lare and pay for any value in excess of the 
stated value appearing on said parcel check; 
and said notice and parcel check gave notice at 
all times named in plaintiff's complaint that de-
fendant would not accept any bag or parcel valued 
in excess of $250.00. 
''That plaintiff then and there had notice 
of the said provisions and terms of the said parcel · 
check and posted notice above set forth; 
"That plaintiff did not at the alleged time 
of his making the alleged delivery and deposit 
of said bag, nor at any other time mentioned 
in said complaint, make any declaration of value 
a.s to said bag or its contents nor pay the addi-
tional charge required in case of value in excess 
of $25.00. 
''WHEREFORE, defendant prays that 
plaintiff take nothing by his complaint, and that 
defendant recover for costs of court herein in-
curred.'' 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To snrh second amended answer plaintiff replied 
as follows (omitting- heading, sig-natures and verifi-
cation): 
'' Conws now the plaintiff, and for his reply 
to the Second Amended Answer of defendant on 
file herein, admits, denies, and alleg-es as fol-
lows: 
•' 1. Replyjng to Paragraph ( 5) of defend-
ant's said amended answer plaintiff admits that 
the claim check which was given to him by the 
defendant has printed upon it the following- words 
and figures : 
''NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or 
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed 
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater sum 
is declared ai~d paid for at rate of 10 cents 
for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for 30 
days or less. No parcel valued in excess of 
$250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remaining 
on hand 30 days may be sold for charges.'' 
''On the reverse side thereof was printed 
these words : 
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED 
''FOR EXCESS LIABILrrY SEE NOTICE 
ON OPPOSITE SIDE. 
''Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24 
hours or fraction there.of. Maximum charge 
for 30 days, $1.00.'' 
and alleges that the said words and figures were 
and are in fine print upon said check, and plain-
tiff did not know the same was thereon, nor waH 
the same brought to his notice or attention by 
defendant or any other person until long after 
defendant had failed and refused to return to 
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plaintiff the bag m~d contents thereof deposited 
with defendant, as alleged in plaintiff's com-
plaint, and plaintiff deposited and checked the 
said bag and the contents thereof, and accepted 
the claim check from defendant without any 
notice or knowledge that the said wording or 
any part thereof appeared upon the said claim 
check, and that he would not have deposited his 
said. bag and the contents thereof with the de-
fendant had he known or been advised that de·· 
fendant would accept the same, or attempt to 
accept the same, only upon the terms and con-
ditions appearing upon said claim check in fine 
print as aforesaid. Plaintiff further admits that 
he did not, at the time of delivering the bag and 
its contents to defendant, as set forth in plain-
tiff's complaint, make any declaration of value 
as to the said bag or its contents, nor pay any 
cparge for defendant's acceptance of the same 
other than as set forth in plaintiff's complaint 
and plaintiff alleges that he was not asked or 
called upon to make any declaration of value. 
''Further replying to Paragraph ( 5) of de-
fendant's said amended answer, plaintiff denies 
each and every other allegation therein contained 
not hereinbefore specifically admitted.'' 
Upon the issues thus raised, the action was tried 
by the lower court sitting without a jury on February 
23, 19.49. The lower court, after submission of the cause 
to it, made and entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law as follows (omitting heading): 
'' Thi., cause came on regularly for trial be-
fore the Court, the Hon. John A. Hendrick.;;, 
Judge thereof, presiding and sitting ·without a 
jury, on the 23rd day of ],ebruary, 1949, on the 
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complaint and reply of the plaintiff and the 
amended answer of the defendant, Neil R. Olm-
stead and Clyde C. Patterson appearing as at-
torneys for plaintiff, and Ray, Quinney & Neb-
eker appearing as attorneys for defendant. Evi-
denCt" \HlS offered by the respective parties and 
the cause was submitted to the Court for its de-
cision, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
• '1. That defendant Southern Pacific Com-
pany at all times hereinafter mentioned was a 
corporation duly organized and existing under 
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Dela-
ware, and authorized to do and doing business 
in the State of Utah. 
'' 2. 'rhat on or about the lOth day of Sep-
tember, 1947, the plaintiff, while in the City of 
Portland, State of Oregon, and while en rout from 
said city to Pocatello, Idaho, delivered and de-
posited with the defendant, and the defendant 
received from the plaintiff at the Union Station 
parcel room in Portland, Oregon, as aforesaid, a 
place of business owned, operated, and under the 
control of the defendant, one large Samsonite 
traveling bag of the value of Forty-Seven and 
50j100 ($47.50) Dollars, containing the following 
items, together with their value on that date as 
follows: 
1 diamond ring ------------------------------$650.00 
1 21 jewel Longine watch ____________ 375.00 
1 stick pin -------------------------------------- 400.00 
1 20-30 Colt revolver -------------------- 50.00 
1 blue suit -------------------------------------- 85.00 
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1 tan gabardine suit --------------------
2 pairs Edwin Clapp shoes _________ _ 
2 Dobbs hats ----------------------------------
1 Lifetime Parker pen set. __________ _ 
1 white wool shirt ------------------------
5 sport shirts --------------------------------
1 dozen pure silk sox ___________________ _ 
1 gabardine topcoat --------------------
·1 electric razor ------------------------------
1 small portable radio -:----------------
10 neckties (hand painted) _________ _ 
4 neckties (hand painted) _________ _ 
2 pairs suspenders ----------------------
1 comb and brush --------------------------
1 aluminum cigarette lighter _____ _ 
1 dozen handkerchiefs _______________ _ 
87.50 
38.00 
40.00 
65.00 
22.50 
10.00 each 
1.50 each 
85.00 
22.50 
37.50 
7.50 each 
10.00 each 
2.50 each 
4.50 
4.50 
.50 each 
to be by the defendant safely and securely kept 
for the plaintiff for a compensation and to be 
returned and redelivered to the plaintiff on re-
quest, and the defendant then and there under-
took to do so, and gave the plaintiff a receipt iu 
writing for the property, as hereinbefore set 
forth, said receipt hearing the number 396841. 
That the total value of the said bag and con-
tents thereof so delivered by plaintiff to defend-
ant was in the sum of Two Thousand One Hun-
dred Ninety ( $2,190.00) Dollars. 
"3. That thereafter, within several hours of 
his deposit, plaintiff tendered to the defendant 
his said receipt and demanded that the defendant 
redeliver and return to the plaintiff the goods 
hereinbefore described in Paragraph 2. 
"4. That the defendant did not take due care 
of or safely keep the goods of the plaintiff, nor 
did it, when requested, return or redeliver the 
10 
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same to the plaintiff, but on the contrary, de-
fendant delivered said bag, together with the 
contents therein, to some ·person or persons un-
kno'\\rn to the plaintiff, and that in so doing, the 
bag and its contents were wholly lost to the plain-
tiff . 
.. 5 .. That the parcel cheek, or receipt, given by 
defendant to the plaintiff had printed upon it the 
following words and fig·ures : 
''NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or 
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed 
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater 
sum is declared and paid for at rate of 10 
cents for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for 
30 days or less. No parcel valued in excess 
of $250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remain-
ing on hand 30 days may he sold for char- · 
ges." 
On the reverse side thereof was printed these 
words: 
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED 
''FOR EXCESS LIABILITY SEE NOrriCE 
ON OPPOSITE SIDE 
"Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24 
hours or fraction thereof. Maximum charge 
for 30 days, $1.00." 
"6. That defendant bad posted at its parcel 
room at the Union Station in Portland, Oregon, 
a sign in words and figures as follows: 
''Protect Your 
PAR C E'L S 
Our Liability for Loss or Damage Is 
Limited to 
$25.00 
11 
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Greater value lnay be declared at time of 
checking upon payment of 10 cents for eac11 
additional $25.00 value or fraction thereof. 
Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in value 
not accepted.'' 
That said sign was posted in said parcel room in 
a place where it was visible to plaintiff as he 
checked his said bag and contents with the de-
fendant. 
"7. That the defendant, at the time of de-
positing said Samsonite bag and the contents 
thereof with the defendant, at said parcel room~ 
did not read the printing on said parcel chec~.: and 
receipt, an did not see nor read the sign posted 
by the defendant, and neither the defendant nor 
defendant's agents called plaintiff's attention to 
the information contained on said printed portion 
of the parcel check and receipt or to the infor-
mation contained on the sign, as aforesaid, nor 
did it i:t;l any way advise the plaintiff of any 
specific conditions or terms under which it ac-
cepted the possession of the bag and its con-
tents, and the plaintiff had no knowledge of any 
limitation of liability on the part of the defend-
ant. 
''The Court having made the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, now reaches the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
"1. That defendant is liable to the plaintiff 
for the value of plaintiff's bag and contents, but 
that the extent of defendant's liability for such 
loss was by contract limited to the sum of not to 
exceed Twenty-Five ( $25.00) Dollars. 
12 
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"2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
ag-ainst the defendant in the sum of Twenty-
Five ( $25.00) Dollars. 
• '3. That the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
his costs of Court herein expended. 
"Let Judg-ment be entered accordingly. 
''Dated this 18 day of ~Iay, 1949. 
/s/ John A. Hendricks 
Judge" 
Based upon such Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of La·w, it made and entered its Judgment as follows 
(omitting heading): 
"This cause came on regularly for trial be- · 
fore the Court, the Hon. John A. Hendricks, 
Judge thereof, presiding and sitting without a 
jury, on the 23rd day of February, 1949, on the 
complaint and reply of the plaintiff and the 
amended answer of the defendant, Neil R. Olm-
stead and Clyde C. Patterson appearing as at-
torneys for plaintiff, and Ray, Quinney and 
Nebeker appearing as attorneys for defendant, 
and the Court having heard the evidence and 
having examined the proofs by the respective 
parties, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises and having filed herein its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and having di-
rected .that judgment be entered in accordance 
therewith, 
'' NO\V~ WHEREFORE, by reason of the 
law and the findings aforesaid, 
"IT S HEREBY ORDERED, ADtTUDGED, 
AND DECREED: 
13 
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"1. That plaintiff have judgment against 
the defendant for the sum of 'rwenty-Five 
($25.00) Dollars. 
"2. That plaintiff have and recover from the 
defendant his costs taxed in the sum of _________________ _ 
Dollars. 
"DATED THIS 18TH DAY OF ~fAY, 1948. 
/s/ Jphn A. Hendricks 
Judge'' 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and J udg-
ment were signed and entered by the lower court on 
May 18, 1949. Thereafter, and within the time allowed 
by law, namely, on July 5, 1949, plaintiff served and filed 
his notice of appeal to this court and on the same date 
filed his statutory undertaking on appeal to this court. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The lower court, having found the facts as it did, 
erred in its conclusions of law as follows : 
"1. That defendant is liable to the plaintiff 
for the value of plaintiff's bag ond contents, but 
that the extent of defendant's liability for such 
loss was by contract limited to the sum of not 
to exceed Twenty-Five ($25.00) Dollars." 
2. The lower court, having found the facts as it did, 
erred in its conclusions of law as follows : 
'' 2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
against the defendant in the sum of Twenty-Five 
( $25.00) Dollars.'' 
3. The lower court, having found the facts as it did, 
erred in its judgment as follows: 
14 
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"1. That plaintiff haYe judg-ment ag-ainst the 
defendant for the sum of Twenty-Five ($25.00) 
Dollars.'' 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's assignments of er~·or, being each related 
to the question of whether the Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment limiting· plaintiff's recovery , to $25.00 are 
proper under the Findings of Fact, the same, in the in-
terest of brevity, will be considered together. 
At the outset we point out that this appeal is upon 
the judgment roll only, and without the evidence in the 
case before this court. Under these circumstances, the 
findings of the lower court are conclusive on appeal as 
to the facts. Kinney vs. Lewis, 2 Utah 512. 
The conclusion of the lower court that defendant's 
liability to plaintiff is limited to the sum of $25.00 is 
predicated upon the theory that the defendant, by print-
ing the notice upon the parcel check given to defendant, 
as set out in full under paragraph 5 of the Findings of 
Fact, and by posting the sign at its check stand, as set 
out in paragraph 6 of such Findings of Fact, limited the 
amount that plaintiff might recover under the facts in 
this case to $25.00. Plaintiff contends that the notice so 
printed upon the check stub and the notice so posted by 
the defendant in its parcel checkroom were wholly in-
effective to so limit defendant's liability for the follow-
Ing reasons : 
1. Because any such attempted limitation of liability 
is wholly ineffective and void as against public policy. 
2. That if such attempted limitation of liability is 
I 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not ineffective and void generally, it is nevertheless in-
effective to limit liability for defendant's conversion of 
plaintiff's property. 
3. That if such attempted limitation is not ineffect-
ive generally, or ineffective generally insofar as a con-
version is concerned, it at most constitutes an offer on 
the part of the defendant to limit its liability, which, to 
be effective, must be accepted by the plaintiff, and no 
such acceptance is shown here to have existed. 
4. That even though it be held that plaintiff accepted 
the limitation of liability offered by defendant, .never-
theless the limitation related solely to "loss of, damage 
or delay to'' any parcel and did not by its terms purport 
to relate to a loss resulting from defendant's conversion. 
The arguments and authorities in support thereof 
will now be considered seriatim. In so considering 
plaintiff's argument, the court should bear in mind that 
the court found in effect, 
1. That the defendant was a bailee for hire. (Find-
ing No. 2) 
2. That as such bailee, it accepted plaintiff's bag 
and contents of a value of $2,190.00. (Finding No. 2) 
3. That instead of redelivering the bag to plaintiff, 
defendant delivered the bag and contents to some other 
person or persons unknown. Finding No. 4) 
4. That while the parcel check plaintiff received had 
printed thereon a purported limitation of liability, and 
while defendant had posted at its check stand a notice 
purporting to limit defendant's liability, the defendant 
did not read the printing on the parcel check, nor see 
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or read the sign posted by the defendant, nor did de-
fendant in any '"ay advise the plaintiff of any specific 
conditions or terms under which defendant accepted the 
bag and its contents. (Finding No. 7) 
I. 
THE ATTE~IPTED LII\1ITATION OF LIABIL-
ITY IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE AND VOID AS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
Appellant's first point of argument is that an at-
tempted limitation of liability by a bailee for hire is 
void as against public policy, and this is true whether 
the basis of the bailor's action against the bailee is in 
tort for con-.;-ersion, or negligence, although admittedly 
the stronger argument is in the case of a conversion. 
The following cases demonstrate this rule under factual 
situations similar to the present. 
Denver Union Terminal Railway Co. v. C'ltlli-
nau, (Colo.), 210 P. 602. 
In this case the Terminal Company operated a pub-
lic check stand in its Denver terminal. Plaintiff checked 
his bag and paid the required charge. Later when 
plaintiff called for redelivery of his bag, it had dis-
appeared. Defendant relied upon a limitation of lia-
bility of a notice posted at the check stand and printed 
on the check stub plaintiff had received. In considering 
this phase of the case, the court observed that the general 
trend of authorities in the United States disaffirmed 
the English rule, which permitted a limitation of lia-
bility, and in the course of its decision held as follows: 
"The transaction under consideration was a bail-
ment for hire in the course of the bailee's general 
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dealing with the public. In such cases contracts 
limiting liability for negligence are generally 
against public policy, 6 C.J. 1112; Denver P. 
W. Co. v. Munger, 20 Colo. App. 56, 77 Pac. 5; 
Pilson vs. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Or. 528, 136 Pac. 
642; Parris et al v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 Pac. 
750.'' 
Further, in discussing the case of Noyes v. Hines, 
220 Ill. App. 409, relied upon by the Terminal Company, 
the court observed : 
''In the Noyes Case the Illinois court goes only 
to the extent of holding the bailor bound by the 
terms of his check or receipt 'in so far as he 
has reasonable notice of the same, and in so far 
as the same are reasonable.' It does hold both 
notice and terms reasonable. This holding is 
based on the assumption that in the absence of 
limitation the company would have been liable 
fpr $100,000 in diamonds if so checked, that plain-
tiff would look for some limitation by reason of 
the small charge, that, looking, he would dis-
cover the notice, and that he could read English, 
and would therefore read the notice, none of 
which assumptions seem to us reasonable. Re-
ceiving and caring for a bag of precious stones 
has no relation to the company's business. l\[any 
greater liabilities are assumed by business con-
cerns on proportionally smaller charges. N umer-
ous travelers cannot read English. Countless 
check stands throughout the country receive and 
care for valuable property where the bailment 
is evidenced by a check containing only a number 
and the· name of the bailee. Such checks carrying 
a pretended contract are in fact the exception. 
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'Vhen they do so there is no justifiable pre-
sumption that persons receiving them will in-
spect them for such a contract. The most, and 
in fad the only, conspicuous thing on the check 
before us is the number and the name of the 
company.'' 
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v. 
Burk, 255 U. S. 317, 65 L. Ed. 656, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held as follows: 
d This court has consistently held the law to be 
that it is against public policy to permit a com-
mon carrier to limit its common-law ,liability 
by contracting- for exemption from the conse-
quences of its own negligence or that of its serv-
ants.'' 
In the case of Agr·ic'ltlttfJral Insurance Cornpany v. 
Constantine, (Ohio), 58 N. E. (2), the Ohio court held: 
"The general rule is well stated in 6 American 
Jurisprudence, 270, Section 176, which reads in 
part as follows: 
'It is now apparently well settled that a 
bailee for hire cannot, by contract, exempt 
himself from liability for his own negligence 
or that of his agents or servants (Franklin 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 
936, 59 A.L.R. 118, Hotels Statler Co., Inc. 
v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N. E. 460, 22 
A.L.R. 1190; Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. 
McQueen, 111 Okl. 107 226 P. 372, 34 A.L. 
R. 162; Sims v. Sullivan, 100 Or. 487, 198 P. 
240, 15 A.L.R. 678; Sporsem v. First National 
Bank of Poulsbo, 133 Wash. 199, 233 P. 641, 
40 A.L.R. 854). Contracts limiting liability-
for negligence in bailments for hire in the 
course of a general dealing with the public 
are generally regarded as against public 
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policy.' Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 
U. S. 317, 41 S. Ct. 283, 65 L. Ed. 656; 
England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 
Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532; Denver Union 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, supra.'' 
In the case of England vs. Lyon Fireproof Storage 
Company, (Cal.) 271 P. 532, the California court held: 
''But a warehouseman may not limit his liability 
for damage ·or loss of goods stored with him for 
hire, so as to exempt himself from damages re-
sulting from his own negligence, nor to relieve 
himself from the exercise of ordinary care. The 
trend of modern authorities holds that such an 
effort on the part of a bailee to exempt himself 
from negligence is contrary to public policy.'' 
In Inland Compress Company v. Sirnrnons (Okla.), 
159 P. 262, the Oklahoma court held: 
''We conclude that it would be against public 
policy in this state to permit the defendant in 
this case as a bailee for hire to contract in such 
manner as to relieve it of any responsibility for 
its own negligence, and that, the provision of the 
receipt issued to the plaintiff in error attempting 
to relieve the company from any liability on 
account of damage, the result of its negligence 
is void as against public policy. Therefore the 
court did not err in instructing the jury to the 
effect that such provision of the contract would 
not protect the defendant against its own negli-
gence.'' 
In Pilson v. Tip-Top .Auto Company, (Ore.), 136 P. 
642, the Oregon court held : 
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'"lt is the better rule that a bailee for hire cannot 
by contract so limit his responsibility to the 
bailor as not to be liable for his own negligence 
or the negligence of his agents and servants.'' 
Other cases to the same effect are to be found in 
citations referred to in the above decisions. 
II. 
IF SUCH ATTEMPTED LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY IS NOT INEFFECTIVE AND VOID 
GENERALLY, IT IS NEVERTHELESS INEFFEC-
TIVE TO Lil\IIT LIABILITY FOR DEFENDANT'S 
CONVERSION O:B., PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY. 
The instant case involves the question of liability 
from the standpoint of defendant's conversion, rather 
than defendant's negligence, and we submit a case of 
conversion constitutes a much stronger case for dis-
affirming an attempted limitation of liability than per-
haps a case of simple negligence. 
The lower court, by its Finding No. 4, found that 
defendant delivered plaintiff's bag to a person other 
than plaintiff. 'l1hat such constitutes conversion by the 
defendant this court has held. 
In the case of Potomac Insurance Co. v. Nickson, 
64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, this court held: 
"Misdelivery, therefore, clearly distinguishes the 
case at bar from a case where the property is 
stolen or is lost through some other misadventure. 
In a case of misdelivery, that act, in and of itself, 
amounts to a conversion of the property held; 
while the stealing of property intrusted to the 
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bailee may or may not constitute conversion, de-
pending upon his conduct and freedom from 
negligence. ' ' 
Thus it is apparent that under the Utah law, de-
fendant's misdelivery of the bailed property constituted 
a conversion thereof, and defendants, purely as a mat-
ter of public policy, should not be permitted by con-
tract to limit its liability for damages occasioned by 
its own wrongdoing. Hence the case of Adams Express 
Co. v. Berry & vVhitmore Co., 35 App. D. 208, 31 LR.A 
(NS) 309, he-comes particularly in point. Here the 
court held as follows: 
"Is it possible for the carrier to extend this 
doctrine of contractual limitation of liability to 
cover cases where the goods are converted or 
embezzled by it~ We think not. So great would 
be the opportunity for fraud that public policy 
will not suffe:r: a practice so manifestly calcu-
lated to invite it. That the shipper, in a part-
icular instance, might be willing to make such a 
concession, does not alter the rule; it is not 
within the power of the individual to barter 
away the right to protection inherent in the 
general public.'' 
III 
IF SUCH ATTEMPTED LIMITATION IS NOT 
INEFFECTIVE GENERALLY, OR INEF],EC~riVE 
GENERALLY INSOFAR AS A CONVERSION IS 
CONCERNED, IT AT MOST CONSTITUTES AN 
OFFIDR ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT 
TO LIMIT ITS LIABILITY, WHICH, TO BE EF-
FECTIVE, :MUST BE ACGEPr~rED BY THE PI.JAIN-
TIFF, AND NO SUCH ACCEPTANCE IS SHOWN 
HERE TO HAVE EXISTED. 
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Our next point of argument is that assun1ing the 
attempted limitation of liability by the defendant bailee 
is not void a.s ttgainst public policy, nevertheless it did 
not brrome effectiYe here for the reason there was no 
acquiescence thereto by plainntiff and such acqies-
cence is essential. 
rrhe decisions of the courts whiCh permit a bailee 
to limitell his liability by contract uniformly hold that 
such limiation must be acquieesced in by the bailor, and 
such acquuiescenco may not be inferred from the fact 
a visible notice was posted, or that the bailor accepted 
a check stub upon \Vhich the limitation was printe·J. 
The theory of these decisions is that when the bailee 
accepts the bailed property, a common law bailment 
thus is established, and he becomes liable to the bailor 
for the value of the property upon failure to redeliver. 
A limitation of this liability constitutes a new con-
tract. The posting of the notice, or the printing of 
the limitation on the check stub may be held to con-
stitute the offer by the bailee to limit his liability, but 
to become effective, it must he accepted in some way 
by the bailor. Such acceptance by the bailor may be 
inferred when, after actual knowledge by him of the 
printing on the stub, he accepts and retains it with-
out protest. 
In the instant case, however, the court specifically 
found as the fact that the plaintiff "did not read the 
printing on said parcel check'' ; that he ''did not see 
or read the sign posted by the defendant"; that "nei-
ther defendant or defendant's agents called plaintiff's 
attention to the information contained in said printed 
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portion of the parcel chsck and receipt or to the in-
formation contained on the sign''; that defendant did 
not ''in any way advise the plaintiff of any specific 
conditions or terms under which it accepted the posses-
sion of the bag and its contents"; and that "plaintiff 
had no knowledge of any limitation of liability on the 
part of the defendant". (Finding No. 7) 
Thus, having expressly found a total lack of actual 
notice or knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of de-
fendant's purported limitation of liability, the court 
concluded as a matter of law that the limitation became 
and was effective. This conclusion plaintiff assails as 
being erroneous. The following cases support plaintiff's 
contentions. 
In Jones v. Great Northern Railroad Company, 
(Montana), 217 Pac. 673, plaintiff sued defendant for 
the value of a lost traveling bag deposited by plaintiff 
with defendant for safekeeping in its baggage room, 
and which defendant failed to return. As in this case, 
plaintiff had received a check stub upon which defend-
ant had caused to he printed a limitation of liability. 
The court laid down the rule as follows: 
"It is elementary that in order to create a con-
tract there must have been a meeting of minds, 
or stated differently, there must have been an 
offer by one party and its unqualified accept· 
ance by the other. Since -it was competent for' 
the defendant as warehousem{an to presc,ribe 
the terms upon which it would render the ser· 
vices contemplated, it may he conceded that by 
tendering the checks it ·made an offer to receive 
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and care for the parcels upon the terms ex-
pressed by the matter printed upon them, so that 
the real question, reduced to its simplest forms, 
resolYes itself into this: Did plaintiffs accept 
the terms thus proposed 1 If they had received 
the checks and had read understandingly the 
matter printed upon them and then retained 
them without objection, they would be held to 
haYe consented to the terms imposed and bound 
by the proYisions for limited liability. As to 
the correctness of this rule there cannot he any 
controversey. If they had received the checks 
and reta·ift~ed them 'Without knowing that they 
contained any terms or conditions and without 
notice from the bailee and upon the assumption 
that the checks were merely the means of iden-
tifying their property, they would not be held 
bound by the provis_ion for limited liabiltiy, upon 
the theory that the minds of the parties never 
met; hence the special contract was never en-
tered into." (Italics added) 
Further the court stated : 
''If the bailee does not call attention to the pro-
vision for limited liability and the bailor does 
not have actual knowledge of its existence, he 
is not bound by it unless his course of conduct 
is such as to lead the bailee, as a reasonable 
person, · to believe that he assents to the pro-
vision; and the mere fact that he retains the 
check without objection does not, as a matter 
of law, constitute such conduct, and in the ab-
sence of notice from the bailee that the check 
contains provisions which are intended to be-
come a part of the contract, the bailor is not 
under legal duty to read whatever inscription 
may be upon it." 
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In Lebkeucher v. Penn,sylvania Railway Company,-
(N. J.), 116A. 323, a case involving a similar factual 
situation, and attempted limitation of liability by the 
bailee, the court held: 
"The parties to a bailment may diminish the 
liability of the bailee by special contract, the 
principle being that the bailee may impose what-
ever terms he chooses, if he gives the bailor no-
tice that there are special terms and the means 
of knowing what they are; and, if the bailor 
chooses to make the bailment, he is bound by 
them, provided the contract is not in violation 
of the law or of public policy and that it stops 
short of protection in case of fraud or negli-
gence of the bailee, and provided further that 
the terms of the contract are clear, such stipu-
lations being strictly construed. 6 Corpus Juris, 
Page 1112, Section 44. 
''This we think a correct statement of the law. 
The bailee must bring home to the bailor notice 
of the special terms upon which the bailment 
is accepted in order to limit liability. In the 
present case the district court found as a fact 
that Mrs. Lebkeucher did not know and was not 
infomed of the limiation of the liability ex-
pressed on the check or upon the placards. In 
this court we must accept the findings of fact 
made by the district court, if there be evidence 
to support them. There was such evidence in 
the case. It being necessary for the bailee to 
give to the bailor notice of the special terms 
of limitation of libility, and \the trial court 
having found that such notice was not given, 
it follows that the bailee is responsible for the 
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Yalue of the suitcase and contents and is pre-
cluded from limiting its liability therefor to 
$25.00. '' 
In Healy 'l'. lv e w York Central and Hudson Rail-
road Company, 138 N. Y. S. 287, affirmed 105 N. E. 
1086, likewise involving a similar factual situation, it 
was held: 
''The business of checking hand baggage at rail-
way stations has become a large and important 
one. It seems to me that any one in the ordinary 
course of business, checking his baggage at such 
a place, would regard the check received as a 
mere token to enable him to identify his baggage 
when called for, and that in no sense would he 
have any reason to believe that it .embodied a 
contract exempting the bailee from liability or 
limiting the amount thereof. If the plaintiff 
knew that the defendant bad limited its liability 
to $10.00, either by his attention being called to 
it or otherwise, then, of course, the law would 
deem him to have assented to it, so that a binding 
contract would be effected. If be did not know 
it, I think the law imposed no duty upon him to 
read his check to find whether or not there was 
a contract printed thereon, or that he was guilty 
of neglect in not so reading it, because be bad no 
reason to apprehend that a contract was printed 
thereon.'' 
In Agricultural Insurance Company vs. Constantine, 
(Ohio), (8) N. E. '(2) 658, it was held: 
''The great weight of authority in this 
country is to the effect that a ticket, such as was 
delivered to this bailor, is a mere token for identi-
fication (Healy v. New York C. & Hudson R. Co., 
210 N.Y. 646, 105 N.E. 1086, affirming 153 App. 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Div. 516, 138 N.Y.S. 287; Denver Union Terminal 
Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27 
A.L.R. 154; Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 68 
Mont. 231, 217 P. 673, 37 A.L.R. 754) and printed 
conditions thereon purportedly limiting the bail-
ee's liability, become no part of the contract, at 
least in the absence of anything to indicate that 
the bailor assented to the conditions before de-
livering the property to the bailee (Fessler V8. 
Detroit Taxicab & Transfer Co., 204 Mich. 694, 
171 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 983; 11aynord v. James, 
109 Conn. 365, 146 A. 614, 65 A.L.R. 427)." 
In Brown v. Hines, (Mo.) 249 S. W. 683, the court 
held: 
''Regardless of whether the defendant could con-
tract against its negligence, there was clearly no 
contract entered into in this case, as there was no 
agreement made by the plaintiff. In. fact, he 
had no knowledge whatever of the limitation." 
* * * * * * * * * 
''There was no showing that plaintiff agreed to 
the conditions printed upon the check, for the 
reason that he had checked parcels before at the 
same check stand and that he saw printed matter, 
which he did not read, upon the check that he 
reeeived when he checked the bag in question, 
as his consent cannot be inferred from these 
facts.'' 
In Green's Executors v. Smith, (Va.), 131 S. E. 846, 
it was held (syllabus 3) : 
''In action by garage keeper to recover over 
damages he was compelled to pay for injury 
caused by his employee in calling for defendant's 
car under storage agreement, evidence failing to 
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show that defendant had notice of condition 
sought to be imposed by garage keeper by circu-
lars inclosed with bill under contract, that owner 
of car hold him harmless from liability incurred 
in delivering and calling· for it, held not to show 
mutuality of assent necessary to sustain eon-
tract.'' 
In VanNoy Intersta.te Cmnpany v. Tucker, (Miss.), 
87 So. 643, it was held: 
''In a case decided by the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of New York, Healy v. N.Y.C. 
& H. R.R. Co., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y. 
S. 287, in a case very much like the case made by 
this record, had this to say, viz. : 
'The coupon was presumptively intended as 
between the parties to serve the special 
purpose of affording a means of identifying 
the parcel left by the bailor. In the mind of 
the bailor the little piece of cardboard, which 
was undoubtedly hurriedly banded to him 
and which he doubtless as hurriedly slipped 
into his pocket, without any reasonable op-
portunity to read it, and hastened away with-
out any suggestion having been made upon 
the part of the parcel room clerk as to the 
statements in fine print thereon, did not 
arise to the dignity of a contract by which 
he agreed that in the event of the loss of the 
parcel, even through the negligence of the 
bailee itself, he would accept therefor a sum 
which perhaps would be but a small fraetion 
of its actual value. 
'The plaintiff having had no knowledge of 
the existence of the special contract limiting 
the liability of the defendant to an amount 
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not exceeding ·,~·10.00, and not "Qeing charge-
able with such knowledge, the minds of the 
parties never met thereon, and the plaintiff 
cannot. be deemed to have assented thereto, 
and is not bound thereby.' 
"We adopt the decision of the New York court 
as the law of this case." 
Thus, we submit, the lower court having spec.ifically 
found a lack of notice or knowledge on the part of the 
plaintiff of defendant's attempted limitation of liability, 
it should, as a matter of law, have awarded plaintiff 
damages in the full value of the bag and contents, and 
its conclusion that defendant's limitation of liability 
became effective despite such want of notice or know-
ledge was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff's acceptance of 
the check stub without notice or knowledge of the 
limitation printed thereon, and without knowledge of 
the printing on the placard did not constitute assent to 
the limitation. 
-IV. 
EVEN THOUGH IT BE HELD THAT PLAIN-
TIFF ACCEPTED THE LIMITATION OF LIA-
BILITY OFFERED BY DffiFENDANT, NEVER-
THELESS THE LIMITATION RELATED SOLELY 
TO "LOSS OF, DAMAGE OR DELAY TO" ANY. 
PARCEL AND DID NOT BY ITS TEH~1S PURPORT 
TO RELATE TO A LOSS RESULTING FROM DE-
FENDANT'S CONVERSION. 
We have heretofore demonstrated by the citation of 
many authorities that defendant's attempted limitation 
of liability did not and could not, under the facts as 
found by the court, rise to the dignity of a contract, 
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and unless and until it did, such limitation could not 
become effective. We now propose to show that even if 
it did become effective as a valid contract, it did not 
become operative here, because this type of loss was 
not within the limitations prescribed. 
Reference to the notice and to the matter on the 
printed stub discloses that the $25.00 limitation relates 
only to ''loss of'' or • 'damage or delay to'' any parcel. 
Our point is that the limitation is thus restricted, and 
does not apply to defendant's conversion of the checked 
bag. 
Here we again invite the attention of the court to 
the lower court's finding that the bag was delivered 
by defendant to some person other than plaintiff; and 
to this court's holding in the case of Potomac Insurarnce 
Company r. Nickson, supra, to the effect that mis-
delivery by a bailee constitutes ·a conversion. 
"Misdelivery, therefore, clearly distinguishes the 
case at bar from a case where the property is 
stolen or lost through some other misadventure. 
In a case of misdelivery, that can, in and of itself, 
amounts to a conversion of the prpperty held; 
while the stealing of property intrusted to the 
bailee may or may not constitute conversion, de-
pending upon his conduct and freedom from 
negligence.'' 
The rule of construction applied to contracts of 
limitation upon a bailee's liability is that the language 
thereof is to be strictly construed. The general state-
ment of such rule is to be found in 6 Am. Jur., Page 
280, as follows: 
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"As a general rule, in such cases the authorities 
hold to the effect that assuming that such a con-
tract is permissible, its language must be clear 
and unambiguous ; and sinc.e such a provision 
is unreasonable, it will be strictly construed by 
the courts and will not be interpreted as effect-
ing the exemption if any other meaning may 
reasonably he ascribed to the language em-
ployed.'' 
Also, 
Fessler v. Detroit Taxi and Transfer Company, 
(Mich.), 171 N.W. 360. 
Adams Express Company v. Berry & Whitmore 
Co1npany, 35 App. D. 208, 31 L.R.A. (NS) 309. 
Gulf Compress Co. vs. Harrington, 90 Ark. 256, 
119 S.W. 249, 23 L.R.A. (NS) 1205; 
Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 197 La. 
172, 31 So. 671, 57 L.R.A. 271, 90 Am. St. Rep. 
285. 
Woodward v. Royal Carpet Cleaning Co., 16 La. 
App. 555 134 So. 443, citing R.C.L. 
Minnesota Butter & Cheese Co. v. St. Pmtl Cold 
Storage lVareho1.tse Co., 75 Jlfinn. 445, 77 N. W. 
977, 74 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
We thus have a situation where defendant seeks to 
extend the limitation relating to "loss" or "damage" 
or "delay" to its own conversion. But certainly the 
reasonable interpretation to be given this limiting lang-
uage is that defendant sought to limit its liability for 
loss resulting from misadventure over which it had no 
reasonable control. Surely it did not intend to limit 
its liability where it itself converted the bailed property. 
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And even if it did, it strains credulity to the breaking 
point to assume that this plaintiff, or any other reason-
able person, \Yonld, in delivering his property to a 
bailee, in effect assl'nt to the bailee's conversion thereof. 
But even if it be conceded that this plaintiff, or others, 
might be so unwary as to assent to a limitation upon 
liability even in the case of a conversion by the bailee, 
we respectfully sumbit that public policy would not 
yield thereto, and any such limitation must of necessity 
be declared null and void. 
The rule was so expressed in Adams Express Com-
pany v. Berry & Whitmore, supra, 
"It is evident that the only way in which a 
carrier may be relieved from its common-law 
obligation to pay the full value of goods lost 
through its negligence is by means of a special 
contract with the shipper, as above noted. It 
is also clear, according to the ordinary rules of 
construction, that such relief is only to the ex-
tent named in that contract. New York C. R. 
Vo. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. Ed. 627. 
Is it possible for the carrier to extend this doc-
trine of contractual limitation of liability to cover 
cases where the goods are converted or embez-
zled by it~ We think not. So great would be 
the opportunity for fraud that public policy will 
not suffer a practice so manifestly calculated to 
invite it. That the shipper, in a particular in-
stance, might be willing to make such a conces-
sion, does not alter the rule; it is not within the 
power of the individual to. barter away the right 
to protection inherent in the general public.'' 
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Thus, we say, that even though plaintiff had as. 
sented to the limitation of liability asserted by defend-
ant, although the facts found by the lower court do 
not permit any such assumption, the limitation may not 
be extended to cover the conversion of plaintiff's bag 
by defendant, first, because the limitation did not by its 
terms purport to cover a conversion, and, second, if it 
did, it would be void as against public policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff submits that 
under the facts as found by the court, which findings 
are conclusive in this appeal, the court should have 
awarded plaintiff damages in the full value of his hag 
and the contents thereof (which value the court found 
to he $2,190.00), and the lower court erred in limiting 
defendant's liability to plaintiff in the sum of $25.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON, 
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSrrEAD, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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